The Board of Immigration Appeals has expanded its restrictive approach to post‑order marriage cases, ruling that a noncitizen’s valid marriage to a U.S. citizen after a final removal order is not an “exceptional” circumstance that justifies reopening removal proceedings on the Board’s own motion.
In Matter of Amit Yadav, 29 I&N Dec. 438 (BIA 2026), decided February 5, 2026, a three‑judge panel led by Chief Appellate Immigration Judge Malphrus denied an untimely motion to reopen filed more than a decade after the Board upheld Yadav’s removal.
Yadav entered the United States in 2008, overstayed his visa, and was placed in removal proceedings, where an Immigration Judge denied his applications for relief and ordered him removed in 2013. The Board dismissed his appeal in 2014, and the First Circuit later denied his petition for review in 2015 in Yadav v. Lynch.
More than 10 years after the Board’s 2014 decision, Yadav sought reopening to apply for adjustment of status based on his 2017 marriage to a U.S. citizen and a family‑based I‑130 petition that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services approved in 2020.
He did not claim any exception to the strict 90‑day filing deadline for motions to reopen under section 240(c)(7)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), instead asking the Board to exercise its discretionary “sua sponte” authority in the interest of justice.
The Board acknowledged that it has power under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reopen or reconsider any case on its own motion at any time, particularly where noncitizens do not qualify for the specific statutory avenues for reopening. But drawing on a line of precedents including Matter of J‑J‑, Matter of G‑D‑, and Matter of B‑N‑K‑, the panel reaffirmed that this authority is “limited to exceptional circumstances” and is not meant to cure filing defects or bypass congressionally imposed time and number limits.
The decision warns that expansive use of sua sponte reopening would erode those limits, undermine the “important public interest in the finality of immigration proceedings,” and conflict with the comprehensive regulatory framework Congress created.
The Board stressed that motions to reopen based on equities acquired while a person remains in the United States after a removal order—such as forming a family, building community ties, or receiving an approved visa petition—“generally do not” amount to a truly exceptional situation.
Citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nken v. Holder, the decision notes that reopening on the basis of equities accrued during the “continued presence of an alien lawfully deemed removable” effectively rewards a “continuing violation of United States law.”
The Board also pointed to a 2025 Supreme Court order in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, quoting Justice Kavanaugh’s view that those who remain in the United States illegally are “jumping in front” of noncitizens who follow the rules and wait to immigrate through legal channels.
Against that legal backdrop, the Board announced a clear rule: “A respondent’s valid marriage to a United States citizen entered into after a removal order does not constitute an exceptional situation warranting sua sponte reopening of removal proceedings.”
Applying that standard, the panel concluded that Yadav’s 2017 marriage and the 2020 approval of his I‑130 petition—both occurring years after his 2013 removal order and the 2014 final BIA decision—did not transform his case into the kind of “truly exceptional” situation that would justify extraordinary intervention. Emphasizing its role as an administrative court of law rather than a court of equity, the Board declined to exercise its discretionary authority and formally denied the motion to reopen.
The Board also highlighted the financial and criminal risks for noncitizens who ignore final removal orders. It noted that a person who willfully fails or refuses to depart, fails to apply in good faith for travel documents, fails to present themselves for removal, or takes steps to prevent or hamper their removal may face a civil monetary penalty of up to 998 dollars for each day of violation under INA § 274D and 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14).
The Board further reminded that anyone who has been denied admission or removed, or who departed while a removal order was outstanding, and later reenters, attempts to reenter, or is found in the United States can be fined or imprisoned for up to two years, or both, under INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
Kishor Panthi
View More PostsKishor Panthi is the founder and editor-in-chief of Khasokhas and NepYork. He is the author of three books, “Kampan,” "UNTRANSLATABLE" and “Zero Mile.” He writes about social issues, immigration, and politics.
